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PRECLUSION DEVICES IN LOUISIANA: COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
When a court of competent jurisdiction rules on the merits of a
case, the judgment should be final, and the parties should not be
allowed to relitigate matters previously decided. Such finality is nec-
essary to insure consistency of judgments and efficient use of over-
crowded courts. In addition it prevents harassing 'litigation, allows
the parties to plan on the knowledge of their rights and obligations,
and protects the integrity of the judiciary by sustaining the judg-
ments of other courts.' To achieve these results, the common law has
developed two preclusion devices:2 res judicata and collateral estop-
pel.' Only res judicata is recognized in Louisiana legislation,' but
recent cases appear to have adopted estoppel.' The doctrine of estop-
pel has received little analysis, however, and there is scant indication
of the breadth of the doctrine in Louisiana.
Common Law
Res judicata is the effect of a prior judgment in a later suit
between the same parties on the same cause of action.' Judgment for
the plaintiff in the earlier suit bars further litigation on the same
cause of action because there is a merger of the judgment and the
cause of action. The plaintiff now derives his rights solely from the
judgment.' If the plaintiff loses, the judgment acts as a bar to a later
suit on that same cause of action.' In either case, the original cause
1. A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 7-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as VESTAL].
2. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES].
3. The term "collateral estoppel" was first used by the RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS (1942), although it is sometimes referred to as estoppel by verdict and
estoppel by judgment. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973), uses the phrase "issue preclusion" to avoid confusion between collateral estop-
pel and ordinary estoppel. Such confusion can be seen in cases which equate collateral
estoppel with judicial estoppel. The latter should be used only in conjunction with the
rule which prohibits parties who have taken a particular position in their pleadings
from changing that position in the course of the litigation or in subsequent litigation.
M. BIGELOW, LAW OF ESTOPPEL lxxxiii, 601-04 (3d ed. 1882).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2286.
5. See text at note 50 infra.
6. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); JAMES § 11.9. Although the term
may be used broadly to include all means by which a former judgment may affect a
later one, it will be used herein only to refer to the effect on a later suit on the same
cause of action. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to §§ 41-44 (1942).
7. Kotsopoulos v. Asturia Shipping Co., S.A., 467 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1972); Union
Guardian Trust Co. v. Rood, 308 Mich. 168, 13 N.W.2d 248 (1944); JAMES 550;
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942); VESTAL 61-62.
8. Miller v. National City Bank of New York, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948); JAMES
550; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942); VESTAL 105.
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* of action is extinguished, as are all issues litigated in support of that
cause of action and all issues which might have been pleaded.
Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, is the effect of a prior
judgment in a subsequent suit between the parties brought on a
different cause of action.1I The prior judgment bars relitigation only
of issues which were actually raised, litigated and necessarily decided
in the earlier suit." Thus, the preclusive effect of estoppel is much
narrower than that of res judicata. 2
Limitations on Collateral Estoppel
Several restrictions on the use of collateral estoppel have been
imposed by the courts to assure each party the right to try his case
once, without affording him more than the single opportunity to
which he is entitled. The first restriction is that only those issues
which were actually litigated may be given estoppel effect. 3 Thus,
many courts refuse to allow estoppel when the prior judgment was
based on a consent or default judgment. 4 A consent decree is particu-
larly unsuited as a preclusion device because it does not involve liti-
gation and determination of issues in an adversary context, but is
merely a contractual agreement between the parties on which the
9. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); JAMES § 11.9. Indeed,
res judicata applies even if no issues were litigated and the judgment was by default.
10, United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Tait v. Western
Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876)
JAMES §§ 11.9, 11.18, 11.19.
11. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); JAMES § 11.19; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 &
Comment p (1942, Supp. 1948).
12. In a second suit on the same cause of action, the doctrine of res judicata
prohibits a party from raising any issue which was, or could have been, raised in
support of that cause of action in the first suit. Professor James explains that the
parties can fairly accurately assess which issues are important to a particular cause of
action, and should be forced to raise them or waive them with respect to that cause of
action. However, because the instances in which collateral estoppel might apply are
more difficult to assess, only those facts to which the parties have turned their atten-
tion may be given preclusive effect in a suit on a different cause of action. James notes
that if a broader rule of collateral estoppel were adopted, the parties would feel pres-
sured, to litigate every minor and petty claim lest it be barred in a later case, thus
impeding judicial efficiency. JAMES 576-77.
13. Larsen v. Northland Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 20 (1934); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
14. Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 94 N.H. 8, 45 A.2d 218 (1946); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 68, comment f (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, com-
ment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). This differs from the rules governing bar and merger,
since even a default judgment will extinguish the cause of action so that it may not
be sued upon later.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
court enters judgment. In many cases the judgment does not contain
a written recital of the issues involved, and consequently it would be
extremely difficult to determine which issues would merit estoppel.
In addition, it would seem likely that in most cases the parties intend
their agreement to have no effect beyond the immediate contro-
versy."5
Different considerations are involved in determining if preclu-
sion should arise from a default judgment. Though no issues are
actually litigated when the defendant defaults, they are nonetheless
determined by the court rather than settled by the parties. While due
process requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to appear
and present his case, he may waive his rights by failing to contest,
and such conduct may even reflect defendant's recognition of the
validity of plaintiff's claim.1" Thus it has been suggested that a de-
fault judgment could be used to bar later litigation of the facts in
plaintiff's complaint. 7
A second requirement is that an issue be litigated between the
parties in order to be precluded. For instance, issues of liability be-
tween parties will not be barred from consideration if they were
aligned as co-defendants in a previous suit adjudicating only the
plaintiff's right to recover from them and not the extent of liability
between them. 8 However, if the defendants in the previous suit liti-
gated the question of their respective liability by means of a third
party demand, the judgment in that case should preclude a later suit
between them since their exact liabilities had been finally deter-
mined.
Another problem associated with the application of collateral
estoppel is determining which of the issues litigated and decided in
a suit may be given estoppel effect. Any lawsuit involves a multitude
of issues of varying importance, some of which may not be fully
15. James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 173-79
(1959).
16. Harvey v. Griffiths, 133 Cal. App. 17, 23 P.2d 532 (1933); VESTAL 198-203.
17. Harvey v. Griffiths, 133 Cal. App. 17, 23 P.2d 532 (1933); VESTAL 196-203.
Professor Vestal suggests that estoppel could apply to an issue determined but not
litigated if it is obvious from the facts of the case that the party's default amounted
to an admission of the validity of plaintiffrs claim. He suggests that this could be
determined by "(1) the importance of the matter to the conceding party; (2) the cost
of litigation; or (3) the ease with which a defense could be made on the conceded
point." VESTAL 200. Thus, preclusion would not be applied when the defendant de-
faulted because his potential liability to the claimant was less than his probable legal
fees. In such a case the default should be considered as an admission only for the
purposes of the first suit, made as a matter of convenience.
18. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942).
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
developed because it would be expensive or impractical to do so or
because the fact finder would be distracted from the main areas of
contention if each minor issue received comprehensive examination.
If collateral estoppel were applied to bar a tangential issue which
received only cursory treatment in the first suit, but which assumed
major proportions in a later suit, serious injustice would result to the
party being precluded. To determine which facts found in an earlier
suit should be given estoppel effect, some common law jurisdictions
have developed a distinction between ultimate and evidentiary (or
mediate) facts.'9 Ultimate facts, defined as those "upon whose com-
bined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right, in question,"2 0
are given estoppel effect. Evidentiary or mediate facts, on the other
hand, are those found in the course of reasoning to the ultimate
conclusion2 and may be relitigated in a subsequent controversy. For
instance, if the nullity of an instrument is alleged because of the
insanity of one of the parties, the ultimate fact found would be the
sanity or insanity of the party. The evidentiary or mediate facts de-
termined in the course of the reasoning might include evidence of
other important transactions, or of lucid conversations held with var-
ious people. These evidentiary facts would not be given estoppel ef-
fect in a later case, such as one to prove the content of the conversa-
tion; whereas the finding as to the party's sanity should be given
estoppel effect in a suit contesting his sanity at the time he made
another instrument (provided the interval between the two transac-
tions does not suggest the possibility of changed circumstances). This
distinction presumes that an ultimate fact received the full attention
of the parties in the first case, and that evidentiary facts, being of
lesser importance, were not exposed to such complete examination."
A more flexible test to determine which issues a party should be
barred from relitigating was suggested in Hyman v. Regenstein,"2
which allowed estoppel when it was evident that the finding of fact
was "necessary" to the first judgment and "it was foreseeable that
the fact would be of importance in possible future litigation."" The
19. JAMES § 11.20; VESTAL 251-56; Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65
HARV. L. REV. 818, 842 (1952).
20. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (1944) as quoted in Developments
in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 842 (1952).
21. Id. at 842-43.
22. A more extreme restriction which has been suggested would limit the use of
preclusion to findings which were ultimate facts in both the first and the subsequent
cases. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
720 (1944); JAMES § 11.20.
23. 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
24. Id. at 510-11.
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test of foreseeability avoids the difficulty often encountered in at-
tempting to distinguish ultimate from evidentiary facts, and ends the
anomaly of refusing to give estoppel effect to a fact labeled "eviden-
tiary," though it may have been the most thoroughly and hotly con-
tested issue of the case. In addition, it focuses most accurately on the
cardinal policy objective of issue preclusion: allowing parties only one
opportunity to develop an important fact, but preserving that single
opportunity.25
Mutuality of Estoppel
Another often cited limitation on the application of collateral
estoppel is the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel which allows only the
parties to a suit to be bound by and to use the judgment rendered
therein as preclusion in later litigation." Because due process prohib-
its the determination of a person's rights in an action in which he is
not represented, collateral estoppel clearly could not be used against
one who was not a party in the prior action. Many courts, however,
also refuse to allow a stranger to the earlier suit to use that judgment
against one who had been a party, considering it unfair to preclude a
party who would not have been permitted to use the judgment if it
had been favorable to him.
The doctrine of mutuality, however, has been seriously ques-
tioned and discarded in a number of jurisdictions."7 The leading case
of this movement, Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Association,2" illustrates the approach which many courts
now take. Mr. Cook, executor of the estate of Mrs. Sather, filed an
account of his administration in probate court. Several heirs con-
tested because Cook had failed to account for funds which they con-
tended he had transferred from Mrs. Sather's bank without her con-
25. This test would require examination into the facts surrounding each case to
determine whether, at the time of the first suit, the parties could have anticipated
future litigation in which a particular issue would again be of major importance.
VESTAL 255.
26. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942): "[A] person who is not a party or
privy to a party to an action in which a valid judgment other than a judgment in rem
is rendered. . . (b) is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication
upon any matter decided in the action."
27. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953);
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A.2d 260 (1934); Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv.
281 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Developments in the Law - Res Judicata,
65 HARV. L. REV. 820, 862 (1951).
28. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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sent. The court settled the account after a hearing, finding that the
funds had been intended as a gift to Cook. Following Cook's with-
drawal as administrator, one of the heirs assumed that position and
sued the bank from which the funds had been withdrawn, again
charging the withdrawal had been without the consent of the de-
ceased. The defendant pleaded res judicata on the basis of the judg-
ment settling the account.
If mutuality of estoppel had been required, preclusion would not
have been allowed because the bank had not been involved in the first
suit. However, the court rejected the old rule, declaring that "the
criteria for determining who may assert a plea [of issue preclusion]
differ fundamentally from the criteria for determining against
whom"" such a plea may be offered. The court reasoned that while
due process would prohibit preclusion of a party who was not a party
to and who therefore was not bound by an earlier judgment, one who
had been bound by an earlier judgment should not be allowed to
litigate again simply because he has switched opponents. Discarding
the mechanical test of mutuality, the court announced that estoppel
would be applied when "the party against whom the plea is asserted
[was] a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication,"30
and held that the plaintiff was precluded from relitigating the ques-
tion of the ownership of the funds. This test has been accepted in a
number of jurisdictions, and fulfills the purposes of preclusion much
more effectively than the mechanical application of mutuality.
However, a selective application of the doctrine of mutuality is
appropriate in some circumstances. Since the plaintiff in the prior
action had the opportunity to select both the time the suit was
brought and the forum in which it was heard, the defendant might
not have been able to present his strongest defense, and judgment
might have been adverse to him as a result of a procedural disadvan-
tage. Thus, the use of a judgment as issue preclusion by a stranger
to the first suit might well be limited to use against the party who
had the initiative in the earlier action.'
Another instance when collateral estoppel may not be appropri-
ate if mutuality is lacking occurs when multiple claimants, whose
causes of action arise out of the same event, attempt to use issue
preclusion against a single defendant, creating what Professor Currie
describes as an anomalous situation. Currie explains his objection
29. Id. at 811-12; 122 P.2d at 894.
30. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added). In addition, the court set out
the requirement that the issue determined in the first suit be identical to the one in
the second suit and that there had been a judgment on the merits in the first suit.
31. Currie 308-22.
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with the example of a train wreck in which fifty people are injured
and sue the railroad in succession. No matter how many times the
railroad won, it would not be allowed to use those judgments against
later plaintiffs who had not been parties in the earlier action. Yet if
the twenty-fifth plaintiff won, the use of that judgment by later
plaintiffs could be justified under the language of Bernhard since the
party against whom the plea is being asserted, the railroad, was a
party to the prior action. Currie argues with some force that collateral
estoppel should not be applied to permit half of the plaintiffs to
recover merely because of the aberration of the twenty-fifth judg-
ment.3
Louisiana Legislation
Unlike the common law, Louisiana does not have a fully devel-
oped doctrine of issue preclusion. The Louisiana doctrine of res judi-
cata is embodied in Civil Code article 2286, but there is no compara-
ble provision for collateral estoppel. Since article 2286 was derived
from article 1351 of the Code Napoleon, the Louisiana concept of res
judicata is identical to that of the French and differs greatly from
that of the common law. Article 2286 establishes the authority of the
thing adjudged as a legal presumption, 3 rather than incorporating
the common law rules of bar and merger of the cause of action. 4
Because the judgment is presumed correct, it is not open to further
litigation. 31 The authority of res judicata takes place only with regard
32. Id. 285-89; See VESTAL 305-23.
33. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2285.
34. Although some courts say that the Louisiana doctrine varies further from the
common law in that res judicata in Louisiana does not extend to issues which might
have been pleaded but which were not, this statement misconceives the "might have
been pleaded" rule at common law. Both Louisiana and the common law bar later suits
on the same cause of action even if new evidence or grounds are offered to support the
cause. The Louisiana cases which interpret "might have been pleaded" to exclude all
causes of action which might have been urged are thus inaccurate.
Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized three exceptions to the strict rule of res
judicata: in petitory actions, suits to partition real estate, and suits for an injunction
of executory process, a party must assert all causes in the first suit, or they will be
waived. Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954). Although the cases speak of
this as a limited acceptance of the "might have been pleaded" rule, it actually goes
far beyond in excluding not merely grounds offered in support of the same cause but
also other causes.
35. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 361, at 241 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]; J. LECLEC'H, De l'AuToRrr9 DE LA CHOSE
JUGgE n 1 (1951) [hereinafter cited as LECLEC'H]; 20 F. LAURENT, PRINCIPLES DE DROIT
CIVIL n' 1 (2d ed. 1876) [hereinafter cited as LAURENT]; Comment, 34 LA. L. REV. 763,
769-74 (1974).
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to the object of the judgment, which will be considered the same as
the object of a later suit only when there is an identity in both suits
between the thing demanded, the cause of action, and the parties.
Because these three identities are strictly required for the application
of res judicata3 and are narrowly construed, the use of res judicata
is often restricted.
The identity of parties required is not physical identity, but
identity of quality or legal capacity. 7 Thus there would be no identity
if the same person appeared in one suit in a representative capacity,
and in the second in his individual capacity.38
Article 2286 also requires an identity in the cause of action be-
tween the two suits, but it appears that this language is the result of
a mistranslation from the French, since the French version of the 1825
Code,3" as well as the Code Napoleon, 0 required identity of cause.
Thus article 2286 should be read as embodying the civilian concept
of cause rather than the common law cause of action." The cause is
the juridical fact which forms the basis of the right demanded, i.e.,
the principle generating the legal right, 2 and should be distinguished
36. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2286; 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVILn o
2686-94 (2d ed. 1905) [hereinafter cited as BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE], LECLEC'H n' 87-98;
2 PLANIOL pt. 1 no. 54 (A) 3, at 35.
38. 3 FUZIER-HERMAN, CODE CIVIL ANNOTE art. 1351, n 0 1254 (1896); CHOSE JUGE9
in8DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCEGENERALE, REPERTORIEn* 281-82 (1847) [hereinafter cited
as DALLOZ]. There would be the needed identity, however, if a party not named in the
first suit was represented therein. Thus a judgment naming the curator of an inter-
dicted person, or the tutor of a minor should be construed as extending to the interdict
or minor. DALLOZ, n' 229, 234.
39. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 2286 (J. Dainow
ed.)
40. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1351.
41. See Comment, 34 LA. L. REV. 763 (1974). The difference between cause and
cause of action is important. Cause is the principle upon which a specific demand is
grounded while cause of action embraces the cause and the demand, and is related to
the party making the demand. Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata
in Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (1940).
42. "The cause of a demand is the juridical fact which forms the legal ground of
the privilege or of the right which is the object of the demand . . . . It is the generating
principle of the claimed right, be it real or personal, its efficient cause .... "BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE n' 2679 (transl. supplied); LAURENT n* 62; LECLEC'H n* 70. Thus, the
cause for a demand of money might be a loan, a sale, or a lease: "I demand 10,000
francs by virtue of a loan: what is the cause of my demand? The loan. I demand 10,000
francs as the amount of a sale: what is the cause of my demand? The contract of sale.
After failing in my demand for 10,000 francs based on a loan, I may demand the same
sum as the price of the sale; the cause differs from the other, and when the cause is
different, the dispute before the judge is entirely different .... ".LAURENT n ° 63.
(transl. supplied.)
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from the grounds or proof offered to advance the claim. Although
different evidence is offered in two suits, if it is offered in support of
the same cause, res judicata applies.43
A judgment on a particular cause and demand bars only a later
suit on that same cause and not a new cause asserted to make the
same demand. Thus it is difficult to avoid a multiplicity of suits
demanding the recognition of the nullity of an instrument if each vice
of form or consent or capacity is considered as a new cause. Some
French writers have attempted to limit such litigation by interpreting
the nullity of the transaction as the cause for the demand of dissolu-
tion.4 In that case a party would have to plead all claims proving the
nullity, since res judicata would bar any later suit on that cause. The
Louisiana courts, however, have refused to accept this position,45 and
thus a party is free to demand the nullity of an instrument in succes-
sive suits based upon different vices.
Another requisite to the application of article 2286 is that there
be an identity of the thing demanded, i.e., of the immediate juridical
benefit or right sought.46 There must be an identity not merely of the
material thing demanded but also of the nature of the right claimed.,7
Thus the judgment refusing a demand for interest as not yet due is
not res judicata in a later demand for the capital amount, since the
first judgment did not have as its object the question of whether the
capital was due.4 8
43. LAROMBIERE, OBLIGATIONS art. 1351 at no 62 (1885). "The distinction [between
cause and grounds] is elementary. The party claiming the right of ownership by
alleging a sale must prove that there was a sale; the cause on which he bases his right
must thus be established by evidence of fact and law which help to prove the basis of
the demand or of the exception; these are the grounds." LAURENT no 65. Thus if the
demand is ownership of a certain thing by virtue of a sale, the cause of the demand is
the sale. However, there may be various means by which the sale would be proven,
such as by written act, or by parol. However, once the demand has been rejected, a
later suit may not be brought on the same cause by alleging other grounds.
44. 2 E. BONNIER, TRAITE DES PREUVES no 876 (4th ed. 1873). Other writers have
suggested that the possible vices should be ranged in three groups: vices of consent, of
form, and of incapacity. Each group would be considered one cause with the individual
vices merely forming the specific proof. Thus if a party alleged a particular vice of
consent and failed, he would not be allowed to charge another vice of consent in a later
action. 5 V. MARCADE, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL art. 1351 at 173-75 (7th ed. 1873).
45. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). See also BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE n * 2681-82.
46. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n 0 2675.
47. Id.; LECLEC'H n 0 51.
48. The identity of demand would seem to be fulfilled when recognition of the
same right is asked in a second suit, even though a different relief or recognition is
requested. However, some Louisiana cases such as Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.
[Vol. 35
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Louisiana Jurisprudence
Prior to 1957, the only preclusion device generally recognized
under Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence was res judicata. The
doctrine was strictly interpreted according to the requirements of the
Civil Code, and any expansion by adoption of the broader common
law theory was resisted by the courts." In 1957,however, the supreme
court adopted common law estoppel as one of the bases for its deci-
sion in California Co. v. Price." A concursus proceeding was insti-
tuted by the California Company to determine the ownership of roy-
alties from mineral leases granted by both the state and the Price-
Beckwith group. In a prior concursus proceeding involving different
leases within the disputed area, the Price-Beckwith title was upheld
over that of the state, and that group was awarded the funds. Based
on that judgment, the Price-Beckwith group filed pleas of res judicata
and estoppel, both of which were sustained by the supreme court
without detailed analysis of which of the two exceptions was the more
applicable. Res judicata would be appropriate if the thing demanded
in each case was construed to be the ownership of the land on which
the leases had been granted, but such an interpretation of thing de-
manded is a great deal broader than that usually given by the courts.
Thus, the court also added that even if res judicata was not strictly
applicable, estoppel would bar litigation of "every material allegation
or statement made on one side in the prior Price case and denied on
the other which was determined in the course of the proceedings."',
Accordingly, since the ownership of the land had been previously
decided, the state was estopped from litigating that question again.
The California case did not treat estoppel52 as a new doctrine in
Louisiana, but noted that it had been applied in several earlier
cases, 53 and, in its opinion, specifically recognized in Quarles v.
2d 14 (1954), have equated thing demanded with the sort of relief asked. Thus a party
is free to litigate his entire claim more than once, merely by requesting a different type
of relief.
49. Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954).
50. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
51. Id. at 350, 99 So. 2d at 747.
52. Although California uses the term judicial estoppel, it is actually collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion. Judicial estoppel bars a party who has made a statement
in his pleadings from reversing his position in the same or subsequent litigation. How-
ever, when a material fact has been litigated and ruled upon by the court the preclusion
which results is collateral estoppel. M. BIGELOW, LAW OF ESTOPPEL lxxxiii (3d ed. 1882).
53. Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936); Heroman v. Louisiana Inst.
of Deaf & Dumb, 34 La. Ann. 805 (1882). The court further noted that although
Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954) had considered those cases as "out of
1974]
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Lewis.4 The court was evidently referring to the discussion in Quarles
of Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manufacturing Co.,5 in which an
exception of res judicata prevailed to bar certain heirs from asserting
their personal claims in a wrongful death action following an adverse
judgment in an earlier suit on their transmitted claims. Quarles
agreed with the ruling in Norton but found res judicata inapplicable,
suggesting that the plea of no cause of action or judicial estoppel
would have been appropriate. Clearly Quarles used the term judicial
estoppel to mean that parties should not be allowed to split a single
cause of action, a concept entirely different from estoppel by judg-
ment. The California court was thus in error in citing Quarles as
authority that Louisiana recognizes issue preclusion.
However, the court was correct in relying on Buillard v. Davis"
as an instance of estoppel by judgment. In Buillard, a petitory action,
line with the rest of the jurisprudence," it had not specifically overruled them, and it
was never the intention of the supreme court to overrule them. California Co. v. Price,
234 La. 338, 350, 99 So. 2d 743, 747 (1957).
54. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954).
55. Id. at 85-86, 75 So. 2d at 17, citing Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178
La. 150, 150 So. 859 (1933). Although the California court did not further specify which
passage in Quarles it was relying upon, it seems most likely that this passage was
intended. However, Quarles did recognize certain aberrations in Louisiana's rules on
preclusion which were termed exceptions to the strict requirements of article 2286. In
addition to the well known exceptions dealing with petitory actions, suits to partition
real estate, and suits to enjoin executory process, Quarles noted a further exception in
certain cases in which an identity of thing demanded was lacking. 226 La. 76, 84 n.2,
75 So. 2d 14, 17 n.2 (1954). That court cited Picard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
York, 212 La. 234, 31 So. 2d 783 (1947), State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108
La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902) and Carpenter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 So. 223
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936) for the holding that res judicata would bar a second demand
on the same' cause of action when the things demanded in the two suits varied from
one another only in time of accrual. Those cases could more accurately be cited for
the proposition that when plaintiff makes a demand and defendant offers an affirma-
tive defense, that defense is also adjudicated and acquires the force of res judicata. In
Carpenter plaintiff sued for disability payments under an insurance policy and lost
following litigation of the affirmative defense that the policy was not in force at the
time of the injury. The plaintiff then sued for payments accruing after the first suit,
but was barred by the plea of res judicata. Although the demand was different in that
it related to payments accruing at a different point in time, the determination in the
earlier suit that no payments were due had acquired the force of the thing adjudged.
Quarles, however, did not view these cases as being a wider, though correct interpreta-
tion of thing demanded, but as exceptions to the normal requirements of res judicata.
If the position in Quarles (thing demanded was only the specific disability payments)
is adopted, this "exception to res judicata" should more accurately be termed collat-
eral estoppel: the second suit is being barred because the issue vital to its success (the
validity of the contract itself) had been litigated and specifically decided in the earlier
suit.
56. 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936).
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the court rejected defendants' plea of res judicata which was based
on two earlier suits refusing to invalidate the administrator's sale by
which the defendants claimed ownership. The court held Civil Code
article 2286 inapplicable because the thing demanded in the two suits
was not the same, but precluded the issue of ownership in the second
case on the basis of estoppel. The Buillard court ruled that a "deci-
sion upon the issues involved by a competent court operates as a
conclusive estoppel between the parties,"5 thus providing a preced-
ent for the use of common law estoppel by judgment as an alternate
basis of decision in California. Yet, because California could have
been decided solely on the basis of res judicata, it stands more as an
indication of the supreme court's willingness to apply collateral es-
toppel in an appropriate case, than as a firm mandate to be necessar-
ily adhered to by the courts of appeal.
Predictably, the lower courts' reaction to California has been
mixed,5" outside of the narrow area of barring relitigation of fault in
demands for alimony after divorce when the wife had previously been
found at fault in a suit for separation from bed and board." In other
areas of litigation, although the Fourth Circuit has consistently main-
tained that estoppel is not a part of Louisiana law and that the court's
statement in California was mere dictum,"0 most circuits seem willing
57. Id. at 281, 169 So. at 86. It is clear that this case involved estoppel by judgment
or issue preclusion, since the court stated, "[wie therefore conclude that the
judgments in [the previous cases] are binding on the respective parties thereto.
Id. at 281, 169 So. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
58. The federal courts, however, have widely accepted California as introducing
issue preclusion to Louisiana law. McDonald v. O'Meara, 473 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir.
1973) and cases cited therein; Breeland v. Security Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.
1969); Stevens v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. Co., 341 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. La.
1972).
59. Fulmer v. Fulmer, 288 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); In re Williams,
288 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Broussard v. Broussard, 275 So. 2d 410 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Richardson, 275 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
After this Comment was prepared for-publication, the Louisiana supreme court af-
firmed the decision of Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974), holding that a
determination of fault in separation proceedings precludes relitigation of fault for pur-
poses of an award of alimony. Although the court based the decision on its interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent behind Civil Code article 160, rather than specifically
relying on collateral estoppel, it would seem that issue preclusion is the most satisfying
explanation of the decision; i.e., because there had been a final determination of a
material issue in the prior case, that issue was not allowed to be relitigated.
60. Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Johnson v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 201 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Shell Oil Co. v. Texas
Gas Trans. Corp., 176 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Most of the courts' state-
ments have themselves been dicta because the cases were not proper ones for the
application of estoppel. For example, Johnson dealt with lack of identity of parties,
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to apply issue preclusion in an appropriate case,"' but have not yet
had occasion to do so.62
Some courts have confused the term "judicial estoppel" in cases
since California by using it to refer to various concepts other than
issue preclusion. An example is Williams v. Marinneaux63 in which
the supreme court affirmed dismissal of a suit against an employer
for injuries to a third person caused by his employee. Because plain-
tiff had released the employee, the supreme court approved the
lower court's action in sustaining an exception of no cause of action.
The court also overruled an exception of res judicata which had been
sustained by the lower court, declining to recognize an exception to
the requirement of identity of parties which had been allowed in some
earlier cases.6 The court did find that the result of those cases could
be supported on the basis of "judicial estoppel."
The concept of judicial estoppel in Williams is not the same as
that in California, which applied issue preclusion between the same
parties. Rather, what the court calls judicial estoppel in Williams is
only the narrow principle that a "cause of action abates against the
person secondarily liable" 5 when in an earlier suit the tortfeasor has
been found not negligent. The rationale supporting this principle
seems to be that to allow separate suits against the two defendants
would threaten to produce inconsistent judgments which might
and Shell Oil was concerned with the federal rule of collateral estoppel as applied
under the full faith and credit clause. But see Bordelon v. Landry where the court
recently held that common law collateral estoppel was not applicable in Louisiana.
The court did so, however, because it felt the supreme court had never carefully
addressed the applicability of issue preclusion, and had never "invoked the doctrine
except in a general and peremptory manner without setting guidelines relative to
necessary elements and limitations." 278 So. 2d at 176. The court made it clear that
its holding was made in the hope that the supreme court would take the opportunity
to grant writs and make a definitive ruling.
61. Olsen Eng'r. Corp. v. Hudson Eng'r Corp., 289 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); State v. Placid Oil Co., 274 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Lege v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 186 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Giroir v. Dumesnil,
172 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
62. Estoppel has not been applied either because of a lack of identity of parties
or because no issues were common to the two suits. Olsen Eng'r Corp. v. Hudson Eng'r
Corp., 289 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (lack of identity of parties); Lege v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 186 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (issue of
disability under Workmen's Compensation Act not at issue in prior tort action).
63. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
64. Muntz v. Algiers & G. St. Ry. Co., 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906); McKnight
v. State, 68 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) (sustaining pleas of res judicata in suits
against persons secondarily liable following an unsuccessful suit against party primar-
ily liable).
65. 240 La. 713, 722, 124 So. 2d 919, 922 (1960).
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hinder the right of a secondarily liable defendant to indemnity from
the primarily liable tortfeasor 8  Clearly then, Williams should not be
viewed as authority for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes
issue preclusion without regard to the identity of the parties. 7
Scope of Estoppel in Louisiana
Although collateral estoppel has been recognized in several
Louisiana cases, there has been little judicial indication of the bound-
aries within which it will be applied. Some limits upon its use are
evident, however, from California Co. v. Price8 and additional guide-
lines may be drawn from the common law experience.
California demands an identity of parties for estoppel," a re-
quirement cited by the courts of appeal as the reason for refusing to
allow estoppel in a number of cases.7" Although not clearly articu-
lated, this seems to be the same identity as required for res judicata.
If so, the requirement should be re-examined in light of the differ-
ences in origin and nature of the two preclusion devices. The three
identities of article 2286 are interrelated and their combined occurr-
ence is required to identify the object of the judgment to which the
presumption of truth and force of res judicata applies.7 The value of
66. The common law has also been troubled with the application of res judicata
when the second suit is brought against one secondarily liable who would be entitled
to indemnity for any judgment he was compelled to pay. The RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 96 (1942) states that when the injured party sues one with an obligation
to indemnify, a judgment on the merits for defendant also terminates the cause of
action against the party entitled to indemnity. The desire to avoid inconsistency of
judgments and confusion in the suit for indemnity seems to be the basis of the rule at
common law as well as in Louisiana.
67. However, some federal cases have so interpreted it, and have gone far beyond
California and Williams in the application of collateral estoppel. For instance, in
Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1967), the court relied on
Williams to bar plaintiff B from litigating an issue which had been found in defen-
dant's favor in a previous suit with plaintiff A notwithstanding that B had not been a
party to the earlier suit and that there was no relationship between A and B giving
rise to vicarious liability. Even in those jurisdictions which have abandoned mutuality
as a requirement for estoppel, it seems that estoppel may be applied only when the
prior judgment is being used as preclusion against a party to the earlier suit. Bernhard
v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
68. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
69. Id. at 350, 99 So. 2d at 747.
70. Olsen Eng'r Corp. v. Hudson Eng'r Corp., 289 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); State v. Placid Oil Co., 274 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974); Giroir v. Dumesnil, 172 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965).
71. LAURENT n * 39, 88.
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the adoption of one of those identities as a blanket limitation on
estoppel is thus not immediately apparent. Moreover, since collateral
estoppel is purely a common law doctrine, the fact that many com-
mon law jurisdictions have discarded the strict requirement of ident-
ity of parties for preclusion, allowing a stranger to use a judgment
against one who had been a party to the suit, should encourage Louis-
iana courts to consider at least a limited use of preclusion when strict
identity of parties is lacking.
The use of collateral estoppel in the California case indicates
that it would be available whenever res judicata would not be applic-
able because of a lack of identity of demands. An expanded use of
issue preclusion in this situation would be extremely helpful, since
the courts' tendency to construe "thing demanded" very narrowly has
unnecessarily limited the availability of res judicata. For instance, in
Quarles v. Lewis," an adjudication decreeing specific performance of
a contract was held to have no preclusive effect on a later suit for
delay damages arising from non-performance of the same contract
because of lack of identity of demand. A more accurate analysis
would have found the cause of the two suits (the contract) to have
been the same, and the thing demanded (relief for breach of that
contract) to have been identical, thus bringing the case within the
scope of Civil Code article 2286.11 However, even if a court prefers not
to apply res judicata when a different relief is requested, it could
allow estoppel of those facts which had been previously determined.
Since the contract and its breach had been litigated and determined,
the only remaining question in the second suit would have been the
amount of delay damages, if any, which were due. The use of estoppel
in such an instance would considerably narrow the scope of the con-
troversy and expedite the second trial.
Another area in which the courts have struggled in applying
traditional notions of the thing demanded is in cases involving recur-
ring suits for periodic interest payments, or for periodic payments
under an insurance policy.74 The narrow analysis is that the cause is
the insurance contract and the rights flowing from it, and that the
demand is the particular payment involved, making res judicata una-
vailable under the terms of the civil code. Quarles v. Lewis approved
this narrow view, but adverted to a jurisprudential exception to arti-
cle 2286 which allowed preclusion in this area when the two demands
72. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954).
73. Money damages and specific performance are merely different sorts of relief
to which plaintiff would be entitled as a result of defendant's breach.
74. See Carpenter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 So. 223 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1936).
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differ from one another only in time of accrual. 5 Rather than adher-
ing to such a jurisprudential exception to the requirements of the
Code which may encourage similar exceptions in inappropriate cir-
cumstances, it would seem preferable to apply collateral estoppel"6 or
to make res judicata available by giving a broader scope to "thing
demanded.""
Although California did not confront the question, it would seem
that, as at common law, estoppel could also be used in cases in which
res judicata does not apply because a new cause is the basis of the
second suit. The use of issue preclusion would be especially beneficial
in cases dealing with nullity of instruments, since as has been noted, 8
Louisiana accepts the narrow view that each possible vice or defect
is a separate cause for nullity. The courts are unwilling to preclude a
party from alleging fraud as the cause of nullity simply because in
an earlier suit based on another vice the validity of the instrument
was upheld. The use of issue preclusion, however, while not barring
the second suit, would streamline the judicial process by refusing to
allow relitigation of any ultimate facts which had been fully explored
in the earlier case.
Another type of case in which a narrow interpretation of cause
prevents the application of article 2286 is exemplified by Bordelon v.
Landry.9 Landry was awarded judgment against Bordelon for dam-
75. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954). Quarles further limited application to cases
in which the demand had been rejected in the first case.
76. If the Quarles view (that demand in these cases is to be taken as the various
payments as they accured) is accepted, collateral estoppel would bar the parties from
contesting in the second suit only those ultimate facts which had been determined in
the first case. Thus if the first case rejected the demand solely because a payment was
not due, the parties would be free to raise other issues, such as whether the policy was
valid. If, however, the first court had rejected the demand because it found that the
policy had never come into effect, the validity of the policy could not be contested in
the second suit. If the first case had awarded judgment for a particular payment after
deciding that the contract was in force, that issue could not again be litigated in the
second suit. Defendant would have to offer some other defense to the claim for a later
payment, such as payment already having been made.
77. This is possible if it is recognized that the object of a demand is defined not
merely by plaintiff's pleadings, but also by the defendant's answer. For instance, if A
demands an interest payment, B defends on the ground that it is not yet due and the
judgment rejects A's demand solely on that ground, the object of the judgment is
merely that no interest is now due and the issue of B's ultimate liability is not reached.
However, if B defends that there is no loan from which interest would be due, and the
judgment grants or rejects A's demand on the ground of the existence of the loan, that
is the object of the judgment. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n* 2675; LAROMBIPRE n' 51; 1 M.
POTHIER, OBLIGATIONs n* 44 (3d Am. ed. 1853).
78. See text at note 46 supra.
79. 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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ages arising out of an automobile accident based on the finding that
Bordelon's negligence caused the accident and that Landry was not
negligent. Bordelon then sued Landry for damages in a separate case,
and the court refused Landry's plea of res judicata because the cause
of action in the earlier suit was not the same." The application of
collateral estoppel in this situation would have prevented the relitiga-
tion of Bordelon's negligence since this had b~en the critical issue in
the earlier case.8'
If collateral estoppel is to be applied consistently, further clarifi-
cation of which issues are to be precluded is essential. Though the
California case stated that judicial estoppel extends to every material
fact decided in the course of the controversy,8" the court does not
explain what it considers to be a material fact, and the statement
that all such issues are to be precluded seems overly broad in light
of the various limitations imposed in other jurisdictions.83 Because
the court did not need to examine this question at length, its state-
ment should not be taken as an end to this inquiry.
Other states have devised numerous tests to narrow the scope of
issue preclusion which is often restricted to "ultimate" facts found
in the first case. The test of Hyman v. Regenstein4 which restricts
preclusion to facts necessarily decided in the first case which could
be foreseen as important in possible future litigation provides a work-
able standard that allows flexibility in the application of estoppel.
Since preclusion must balance the need for the efficient use of the
courts against the desire to allow full litigation of each lawsuit, the
reasonable expectations of the parties as to what issues are important
seems to be a fair guide in this determination.
In any case, the scope of preclusion should not be determined by
the application of mechanical rules, but by weighing the competing
interests of efficiency and fairness to the litigants. Thus, in certain
types of cases, the law may favor relitigation of issues rather than
preclusion. Louisiana courts, despite their limited experience with
80. The court noted that " 'cause of action' is not synonymous with 'automobile
collision,'" and opined that the parties' causes of action were their respective injuries.
Thus there was no identity of cause of action between Bordelon's suit on his injuries
and Landry's suit on his. 278 So. 2d at 175.
81. The court of appeal refused to apply collateral estoppel in the hope that the
supreme court would grant writs and make some definitive statement on collateral
estoppel, since this case would have been an ideal one for its application. However, no
action has been taken by the court.
82. 234 La. 338, 350, 99 So. 2d 743, 747 (1957).
83. See text at note 19 supra.
84. 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
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estoppel, have at least tacitly faced this issue in alimony cases. Civil
Code article 160 allows alimony after divorce to the wife who has not
been at fault. If an earlier suit for separation from bed and board was
granted on the basis of fault, and the divorce has been granted on the
basis of the spouses' living separate for two years85 or because there
has been no reconciliation after the judgment of separation,8 the
court must decide if the prior determination of fault should bar reliti-
gation in the alimony suit.
If the husband has been granted a separation on the basis of the
wife's fault, the cases hold that she is estopped from relitigating fault
in a demand for alimony." When the wife obtains the judgment of
separation her freedom from fault has been litigated if she sued on
the basis of the husband's abandonment, since she is required to show
that she had given him no lawful cause to leave the matrimonial
domicile.88 In this case, the jurisprudence has recognized that the
husband should be estopped from raising the question of fault in the
suit for alimony." The wife's freedom from fault is also decided in a
85. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950).
86. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950).
87. Broussard v. Broussard, 275 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), held that a
wife is estopped from litigating the question of her freedom from fault in her demand
for alimony when the husband has obtained a judgment of separation on the basis of
the wife's abandonment, since the wife's fault was a material issue decided in the
course of the separation suit. Richardson v. Richardson, 275 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), held that when the husband obtains the separation on the basis of the wife's
habitual intemperance and the divorce on the basis of no reconciliation, the wife's fault
has been determined in the separation suit and cannot be relitigated. Thus it would
seem that whenever the husband has obtained a divorce or a separation based on the
wife's fault, she will be precluded from raising that issue in a later demand for alimony.
88. LA. CIv. CODE art. 143: "Separation grounded on abandonment by one of the
parties can be admitted only in the case when he or she has withdrawn himself or
herself from the common dwelling, without a lawful cause. "Lawful cause has
been interpreted as fault on the part of the other spouse.
89. In Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), writ ref'd, 258
La. 775, 247 So. 2d 868 (1971), the court in dictum viewed a refusal to relitigate as the
means of stopping fraud through collusive suits. Accord, Fulmer v. Fulmer, 288 So.
2d 398 (La: App. 4th Cir. 1974). Contra, Davidson v. Jenkins, 216 So. 2d 682 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968); Gamino v. Gamino, 199 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). However,
the court in Ballard v. Ballard, 283 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973), followed the
case of Guarisco v. Guarisco, 271 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), rather than
Rayborn and held that when the wife introduces a prior judgment of separation based
on the husband's abandonment, the burden of proof shifts to the husband to prove that
the wife was at fault and thus not entitled to alimony. In Guarisco, however, the wife
had obtained the separation on the basis of the husband's cruel treatment, and her
freedom from fault was never at issue. In Ballard, the separation was based on the
husband's abandonment. The decision reached in Fulmer on similar facts seems more
correct.
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separation suit in which she is the plaintiff when her husband unsu-
cessfully meets her allegation of fault with a defense of comparative
rectitude or mutual fault.' If the court finds that the wife was not at
fault, the determination should bar further litigation in the alimony
demand.'
The use of estoppel in these circumstances however, has not
been universally accepted.92 A strong dissent in Broussard v.
Broussard93 points to the social harm in requiring the parties to fully
litigate fault in the separation suit or face estoppel in the alimony
demand. Such litigation can effectively destroy any possibility of the
spouses' reconciliation. While this objection merits consideration, it
is offset by the fact that to allow the parties to circumvent the law
by obtaining an immediate separation (e.g., on the grounds of the
husband's abandonment when the wife is actually at fault) and then
to permit the parties to turn around and contest the grounds of the
separation is to work a fraud on the court. Since the parties may
obtain a separation by living separate and apart for one year, the use
of estoppel to prevent collusive suits seems to be a good policy.,4
Another aspect of estoppel which merits close attention is the
effect, if any, to be given a default or consent judgment. The tradi-
tional requirement that collateral estoppel extends only to issues
which have been litigated and adjudicated would seem to render it
inapplicable in cases decided by default or consent. Some writers,
however, have urged the use of collateral estoppel following certain
default judgments when it is certain that such use would not overly
prejudice the defendant. Although the problem was not at issue in the
California case, the court apparently presumed that a full litigation
90. When the wife sues for separation on the basis of the husband's fault and he
merely answers with a general denial, the wife's freedom from fault has never been
decided, and the judgment could have no preclusive effect in the alimony suit. Never-
theless, the cases hold that when the wife is granted a separation on the basis of the
husband's cruel treatment, and mutual fault is not put at issue, the wife may introduce
the judgment of separation in her suit for alimony and the burden then shifts to the
husband to prove the wife at fault. Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971); August v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 9 So. 2d 402 (1942).
91. It must always be kept in mind that the judgment of separation should be
given estoppel effect in the later alimony action only when there is no allegation that
after the separation the wife had committed acts causing the divorce. Thus, estoppel
should generally be allowed when the divorce is based on no reconciliation following
the separation. In re Williams, 288 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
92. Davidson v. Jenkins, 216 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Gamino v.
Gamino, 199 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
93. 275 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
94. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Persons,
34 LA. L. REV. 201 (1974).
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would be required whenever preclusion is to be applied. In view of
Louisiana's limited experience with collateral estoppel, it seems
likely that if the question were squarely presented, the court would
refuse preclusion based on a default judgment.
Conclusion
The Louisiana supreme court in California Co. v. Price recog-
nized the need for a broader preclusion device in Louisiana than
article 2286. But the case was not very strong and it has created
uncertainty in the courts of appeal. Wider use of collateral estoppel
to narrow the range of controversy in a second suit would be a benefi-
cial supplement to the narrow scope of res judicata as construed by
Louisiana courts and would avoid repetitious, costly, and time-
consuming litigation inherent in the courts' apparent unwillingness
to broaden their interpretation of "cause" and "thing demanded.""
Although collateral estoppel is a common law doctrine with no coun-
terpart in the civil law, additional preclusion devices are needed to
alleviate the congestion in the courts, which did not exist when the
Code was adopted. As noted in another jurisdiction, "the doctrine of
res judicata is primarily one of public policy and only secondarily of
private benefit to individual litigants."" Louisiana must choose be-
tween efficient courts and the limitless opportunity for each person
to litigate when the strict requirements of res judicata are not met.
If the courts are unable to make a clear choice, the legislature should
act.
Marilyn C. Maloney
95. See text at notes 44 and 72 supra.
96. Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 130, 172 A. 260, 262 (1934).
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